THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Trusts-Conflict of Interests-Trustee's Personal and Fiduciary Holdings
of Shares in Corporation-[Federal].--The defendant owned an undivided third
of a ranch. He held another third as fiduciary for the widow and children of his
brother, his former partner, as follows: as executor, one-fifth for the widow, and
as trustees, four-fifths for the children. The remaining third he held in the same
proportions as the first two-thirds subject to a contingency upon which this
third would vest in the manager of the ranch. Two years after his brother's
death the defendant incorporated the ranch and issued proportionate amounts
of stock to the respective estates, leaving the manager's prospective shares in
the treasury. After the manager's interest had vested and the period of administration had ended, the defendant bought for his own account the manager's
stock at an advantageous price. At this time the defendant still held the widow's
shares and was still trustee of the childrens' interests. The widow and each child
then brought separate actions to impress a constructive trust on ratable portions of the acquired stock. On appeal from judgments dismissing the actions,
held, the defendant had prima facie violated a fiduciary's duty of loyalty and
must prove good faith and "a wise discretion" to avoid liability. Reversed and
remanded, one judge dissenting, Wootlen v. Wootten.'
It is recognized that the fiduciary's duty of loyalty not only forbids self-dealing or disloyal conduct, but also demands that he avoid all positions possibly
conducive to such conduct. Thus a trustee must not buy from,2 sell to,3 or buy
a claim against the trust, 4 or an interest in the sdbject matters of the trust, because such acts will place him in a position of conflict between his individual
and his representative interests .6 The beneficiary can complain not only of actual or impending injury, but also of the remote possibility of injury where it is
occasioned by the position of the trustee.
The facts in the instant case are unusual, and the very few similar cases reach
a contrary result. The Supreme Court of Washington has held that where an
executrix individually held 249 out of 500 shares of a corporation, and the estate
contained 249, her individual purchase of the two remaining shares did not

1I15

F. 2d

147 (C.C.A. ioth, x945).

2In re Schmidt's Estate, 163 Misc. i56, 297 N.Y. Supp. 328 (1937); Rest., Restitution
§ 192 (1937).

3St. Paul Trust Co. v. Strong, 85 Minn. x,88 N.W. 256 (igoi).
4Holman v. Kirby, i98 Ark. 326, 128 S.W. 2d 357 (I939); In re Strickler's Estate, 328 Pa.
145, 195 Ati. 134 (1937); Rest., Restitution § I96 (1937).
5 Crawford v. Crawford, i29 Fla. 746, 176 So. 838 (I937); Johnston v. Loose, 201 Mich. 259,
167 N.W. 1o21 (198). Contra: Houghteling v. Stockbridge, x36 Mich. 544, 99 N.W. 759

(i9o4),where the court permitted an executor to buy stock in a corporation in which the estate

was interested.
6Johnston v. Loose, 201 Mich. 259, 167 N.W. 1021 (1918); Boynton v. Brastow, 53 Me. 362
(I865s); 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 484 (1935). All these principles apply to other fiduciary
relations, including simple agency. Cf. Little River Drainage Dist. v. Sheppard, 320 Mo. 341,
7 S.W. 2d 1013 (1928).
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constitute a breach of trust.7 In Anderson v. Beans a trustee held all the shares
of a family corporation, half of them individually and half in trust. The court
allowed him to sell some of the trust shares to officers of the corporation, thus
reducing the trust holding to a minority interest.
Although the Anderson case might be distinguished on the facts from the
principal case, it seems that the Massachusetts court nevertheless misinterpreted the problem in basing its conclusion on the conceded discretion of a trustee
in handling the trust investments. 9 This is reasoning from the rules applying
to the business administration of trusts to the principles governing the relations
of trustee and beneficiary. The latter frequently result in quasi-punitive rules,
and represent a policy on the part of the courts hostile to a trustee who has
interests connected with the trust corpus. In the instant case, for example, the
issue is not whether the bare failure to purchase stock for the trust is actionable.
Had a disinterested trustee held the beneficiary's shares, his failure to invest
would probably not be actionable. ° The defendant, an interested trustee, is
held, however, because courts are opposed to trustees profiting from deals in
which the trust is in some way connected, regardless of the form of the transaction.,, The decision is, therefore, in this respect clearly in line with the prophylactic rules of trust law.
The decision in the present case suggests, however, that an inflexible application of these strict principles does not always lead to sensible results. As has
been shown, the defendant's transaction, if taken by itself, does not stand up
under settled rules of trust law. Yet, if the defendant's peculiar position be con7 In

re Johnson's Estate, 187 Wash. 552, 6o P. 2d 271 (1936).
432, 172 N.E. 647 (1930).

8272 Mass.

9Ibid., at 446 and 653.
1*The will gave the trustee broad powers to buy, sell, invest, or reinvest. When such discretion is vested in the trustee, courts are reluctant to interfere with his judgment. York v.
Maryland Trust Co., x49 Md. 6o8, 131 Atl. 829 (1926). The trustee might refuse to invest
because of the uncertainties of the ranching business. CL In re Meyer's Estate, ii Cal. App.
2d 409, 53 P. 2d 984 (1936). Conversely, the maintenance of the trust's voting position in a

corporation has been held to justify a trustee's subscription to stock where rights had been
issue. In re Vanderblt's Estate, 132 Misc. zo, 229 N.Y. Supp. 631 (1928); in re Tower's
Estate, 253 Pa. 396, 98 AtI. 576 (i9z6); Young v. Hood,
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N.C. 8oi, 184 S.E. 823 (1936).

But a Massachusetts dictum suggests that failure to take an opportunity to buy the other
half-interest in a house, one half-interest in which was in trust, might be improper management
on the part of the trustee, and breach of trust ifhe bought the outstanding half-interest for
himself. Pine v. White, 175 Mass. 585, 588-89, 56 N.E. 967, 968 (igoo). This is probably extreme, even as dictum.
11"As long as he [the trustee] is not acting in his own interest the standard fixed for his behavior is only that of a reasonable degree of care and skill and caution. When, however, the
trustee acts in his own interest in connection with the performance of his duties as trustee, the
standard of behavior becomes more rigorous. In such a case his interest must yield to that of the
beneficiaries." 2 Scott, Trusts § 170.25 (1939); cf. Dolbeare v. Bowser, 254 Mass. 57, 149 N.E.
626 (1925). It has been held, in circumstances similar to the instant case, that a trustee who
forces a corporate officer to buy the trustee's individual shares on threat of dismissal, is accountable to the trust for profits. In re Steinberg's Estate, 5 Cal. 2d 674, 56 P. 2d 202 (1936).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

sidered, there is no logical basis for voiding his transaction. He had before the
transaction controlled and managed the corporation by virtue of his combined
individual and fiduciary holdings; and, as the dissenting judge points out, regardless of the source of his control, so long as he continues as trustee the defendant owes the beneficiaries the duty to administer their estate faithfully. No
greater conflict of interest is forseeable than whatever may already exist. It is
also doubtful that the mere reduction of a trust holding to a minority interest
is in itself actionable.12 It may well be that these considerations prompted the
court to assume what seems to be a position of indecision, namely remanding
the case and permitting proof of good faith by the defendant. Ordinarily, when
attacked on basis of disloyalty, an act of a trustee is voidable at the option of
3
the beneficiary without regard to the good faith of the trustee.
In holding for the widow the court erred at least in part. As the dissent observes, in placing the widow-legatee in the same position as the cestuis, the
majority imposes on an executor a status not generally held to be his. Only in
exceptional cases does an executor have a duty or a power to make any investments at all, as where he holds idle funds during a prolonged administration
period.'4 It appears that there were not sufficient funds in the widow's share of
the estate to make the desired investment. Moreover, it is not clear why the
court in the instant case treated the defendant as an executor. Since the period
of executorship was ended, at most he appears to be a de facto agent, who
could avoid liability by simply giving notice of his intentions.'s
12In re Johnson's Estate, 187 Wash. 552, 555, 6o P. 2d 271, 272 (3936). A possible ground
for such an action would be the resulting disadvantages (e.g., in regard to dividend policy) of
minonty stockholding at the termination of the trust. Although the court in Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 37o N.W. 668 (igig) held that the majority-management could not
withhold dividends, Bonbright points out that such suits are often Pyrrhic victories. 2 Bonbright, Valuation of Property 1073 (3937), discussing the stock valuation problem of James
Couzens, Ti B.T.A. 3040 (1928). A more specific argument against such an action in the instant
case is that, if reducing the trust holdings to a minority interest is actionable per se, then the
defendant would have been liable even if he had sold his individual interest to the manager.
But such a holding, the dissenting judge argues with justice, would be absurd.
13In re Fulton's Will, 253 App. Div. 494,
Trustees § 484 (1935).
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N.Y.S. 2d 9x7 (1938); 3 Bogert, Trusts and

141n re Kohler's Estate, 348 Pa. 55, 33 A. 2d 92o (1943); Frey v. Demarest, 17 N.J. Eq. 71
(1864); King v. Berry, 3 N.J. Eq. 261 (3835).
,s Coles v. Denslow, 270 Fed. 22 (C.C.A. 8th, 192r). Whether such notice was present in the
instant case is not clear from the record.
The court mentions the liability of the defendant as corporate officer. It is difficult, however, to see how he could be held liable on this theory. A corporate officer owes no duty to
disclose to the corporation or its stockholders a private opportunity in the absence of bad
faith or direct competition with the business of the corporation. Ontjes v. MacNider, 232 Iowa
562, 5 N.W. 2d 86o (1942); Solimine v. Hollander, 128 N.J. Eq. 228, 16 A. 2d 203 (1940).
Likewise, any element of partnership or coadventurer relationship which survived the decedent
ended with the incorporation of the ranch, and hence the court's discussion of the doctrine of
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 364 N.E. 545 (1928) seems irrelevant.

